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Abstract: Ontario’s general election on Oct. 6, 2011, produced a hung parliament and left much 
unresolved. The Progressive Conservative party under Tim Hudak entered the election year with 
promising prospects, and the PCs won 37 seats, 10 more than in 2007, yet failed to beat out the 
Liberals. The New Democratic Party under Andrea Horwath also enjoyed a much improved seat 
count of 17 elected members to Queen’s Park. Combined, the incumbent Liberals were re-
elected, but reduced to a minority of 53 seats, one seat shy of a majority, and the first minority 
government in Ontario politics since 1985. Premier Dalton McGuinty’s attempt to secure a 
majority of seats in the form of 2012 by-elections failed, and shortly thereafter he resigned, 
leaving his Liberals and Ontario politics on stand-by for a possible non-confidence vote and, 
consequently, a new election. This review examines how the 2011 result unfolded. We place 
attention on campaign dynamics and issue salience. 
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Résumé: L’élection générale tenue en Ontario le 6 oct. 2011 a résulté en un parlement sans 
majorité et une situation indécise. Le Parti Progressiste Conservateur de Tim Hudak entreprit 
l’année électorale avec des perspectives prometteuses, et le PC gagna 37 sièges, 10 de plus qu’en 
2007, échouant cependant à battre les Libéraux. Le Nouveau Parti Démocratique d’Andrea 
Horvath profita également d’une représentation accrue à 17 sièges à Queen’s Park. Au total, les 
Libéraux sortants furent réélus, mais réduits à une minorité de 53 sièges, à un siège de la 
majorité, formant ainsi le premier gouvernement minoritaire en Ontario depuis 1985. Le premier 
ministre Dalton McGuinty échoua à atteindre la majorité par le biais d’élections partielles et 
démissionna peu après, laissant ses Libéraux et la politique ontarienne dans l’attente d’un 
possible vote de non-confiance et, conséquemment, d’une nouvelle élection. Cet article discute 
les résultats de l’élection de 2011, avec une attention particulière à la dynamique de la campagne 
et aux résultats marquants. 
 
Mots-clés: Ontario, elections 
 
Editor’s note:  This analysis was completed in Spring 2013
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Introduction 
 
In some ways, we still await the ultimate 
result of the 2011 Ontario general election. 
While the incumbent Liberals did win the 
election, they were reduced to 53 seats, one 
seat shy of a majority. A year later, a pair of 
by-elections could have changed the 
parliamentary dynamics with the resignation 
of two legislative seats. One riding, Vaughn, 
was held by former finance minister Greg 
Sorbara, and widely expected to remain 
Liberal. However, the other seat, Kitchener-
Waterloo, had been held by Elizabeth 
Witmer of the Progressive Conservatives 
since 1990.
1
 She resigned to pursue a career 
as chair of the Workplace Safety Insurance 
Board, leaving an opening for the Liberals, 
who typically finished second in the riding, 
and who regarded that riding as the key to a 
parliamentary majority. Some speculated 
that it was precisely this opportunity 
McGuinty sought when he nominated 
Witmer for that new public sector job, while 
Witmer, herself, stated publicly that her 
resignation was motivated by the health of 
her husband (Ferguson, 2012; Paige, 2012; 
Talaga, 2012).  
In a way, the by-elections of 
September 6, 2012, did change 
parliamentary dynamics, but not in the 
Liberals’ favour. While they held Vaughn, 
Kitchener-Waterloo elected New Democrat 
Catherine Fife, a victory that in part may 
reflect the “orange wave” that swept Canada 
during the 2011 federal election, and 
perhaps other ongoing issues, such as the 
labour dispute between Queen’s Park and 
Ontario teachers. In addition, with the 
Liberals having replaced its leader on 
January 26, 2013, the situation immediately 
became and remains unstable. Whether the 
2011 election results dissolve into an earlier-
than-expected general campaign is a 
question we cannot, at present, determine. It 
is less certain what that campaign would 
produce. What we could explore, however, 
was the manner in which the 2011 election 
transpired into the current less-than-stable 
result.  
We approach this review of the 2011 
election by drawing on party platforms, 
newspaper coverage of the campaign, 
publicly available public opinion polls, 
regional election results and an internet 
panel survey conducted by Ipsos-Reid at the 
conclusion of the 2011 election.  
 
Vote Results and Regional Patterns  
 
Results of the 2011 election are summarized 
in Table 1, which also displays the 2007 
results for comparison.
2
 While the Liberals 
held on with a minority government of 53 
seats, they lost nearly 20 seats compared to 
2007 and saw their vote share drop five 
percentage points. The two opposition 
parties saw gains, however the pattern is 
uneven. The voter momentum was more 
apparent for the NDP, which saw a six 
percentage-point increase in vote share and a 
gain of seven seats. The PCs, on the other 
hand, saw a more modest four percentage-
point gain in vote share, but its seat count 
grew by 11. 
In past elections, there has been 
substantial overlap in seats won by a party at 
one level of government and a similarly 
named party at another level, but that was 
less apparent in the 2011 election despite 
only five months elapsing since the federal 
vote. This suggests that the election was a 
first-order election in its own right (see 
Cutler 2008), dominated by concerns 
particular to Ontario, which we will explore 
below.  
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Table 1: Vote and seat results in 2007 and 2011. 
 2007  2011  Change 
 Votes Seats  Votes Seats  Votes Seats 
Liberal 42%     71  38%     53  -5%    -18 
PC 32%     26  35%     37   4%     11 
NDP 17%     10  23%     17   6%       7 
 
        
 
 
 
Table 2: Regional vote and seat results in 2007 and 2011. 
 
 
2007 
 
Liberal PC NDP 
 
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
       
Toronto 45.5% 18 23.7% 0 21.3% 4 
GTA 47.3% 14 33.4% 4 10.8% 0 
Hamilton/ 
Niagara 
37.7% 5 33.2% 3 20.5% 3 
East 40.2% 12 38.5% 10 11.8% 0 
Southwest 39.7% 15 34.1% 9 14.6% 0 
North 43.8% 7 14.6% 0 36.8% 3 
       
Total 42.2% 71 31.8% 26 16.8% 10 
 
      
 
2011 
 
Liberal PC NDP 
 
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
      
Toronto       45.0%  17 24.1%  0 27.1%  5 
GTA         43.7%  13 35.5%  4 16.7%  1 
Hamilton/ 
Niagara 
35.2% 4 34.3% 3 26.5% 4 
East        34.4%  8 43.9% 14 17.3% 0 
Southwest      32.8% 7 40.6%  15 21.9% 2 
North        32.0% 4 24.8%  1 40.5% 5 
       
Total        37.6%  53  35.4% 37 22.7%  17 
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An examination of federal and 
provincial vote patterns in Ontario is 
facilitated by the fact that the province uses 
the same configuration of electoral 
constituencies created for the federal 
redistribution. The one exception is that 
there is an additional seat allocated to 
northern Ontario meaning that there are 107 
provincial electoral districts, rather than the 
106 federal constituencies. The boundaries 
south of the Nipissing (North Bay) 
riding are the same for both levels of 
government. 
There were 45 seats won by different 
parties between the federal and Ontario 
elections of 2011, the majority of them 
being in the northern suburbs within 
Toronto, and the adjacent Greater Toronto 
Area (GTA) coterminous with the 905 area 
code up to the Mississauga/Oakville 
boundary. In most cases they were federal 
Conservative seats that the Liberals won 
provincially.  
The swing in the province-wide 
popular vote between the 2007 and 2011 
elections indicated a decline in the Liberal 
edge over the PCs from 10.4 to 2.2 
percentage points. However, as reflected in 
Table 2, there were substantial variations by 
region.  
In short, the election witnessed an 
extension in the previously established trend 
toward urban-rural polarization. For many 
years, Toronto and the larger urban centres 
have favoured the Liberals and to a lesser 
extent the NDP, while smaller cities and 
rural areas have been disproportionally PC. 
What was different in 2011 was that the 
trend has become further exaggerated. In 
Eastern and Southwestern Ontario, the PC 
margin over the Liberals expanded by well 
over 10 percentage points, while in the city 
of Toronto there was barely any change 
from 2007. To illustrate with some specific 
constituency examples, the narrowest 2007 
losses for the PCs in Toronto had been in the 
ridings of Don Valley West and Eglinton-
Lawrence, where their margins of defeat 
expanded by more than 15 percentage points 
in each, even though the party was gaining 
province wide. 
It might be added that in the more 
rural Eastern and Southwestern sections of 
the province that the few constituencies not 
won by the PCs were in the urban 
concentrations of Ottawa, London and 
Windsor. The GTA and Hamilton-Niagara 
regional margins did move somewhat 
toward the PCs, but less so than the 
provincial average. Northern Ontario was 
the NDP’s strongest area of growth moving 
from a seven-point deficit to the Liberals in 
2007, to an eight-point advantage this time. 
A contributing factor in this increasing 
regional distinctiveness appeared to be a 
backlash to a McGuinty Liberal government 
program of proliferating wind turbines in 
rural areas that many saw as a visual blight.
3
 
 
Pre-Campaign Context 
 
Conditions for the Liberal vote and 
seat losses began to unfold well before the 
actual election campaign. Almost since its 
re-election in 2007, the party had been in a 
monotonic decline in public opinion. Since 
2010 – more than a year before the election 
– the party had been trailing the Progressive 
Conservatives, as shown by a series of polls 
(see Figure 1, left panel). Although the 2007 
election was also closely fought between the 
two parties, one of the key differences 
between the two was the rise of the NDP.
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  Figure 1: Public opinion polls before and during the election campaign. 
 
 
Note: The graph on the left shows publicly available public opinion polls prior to the election. The graph on the right 
shows polls just before and during the campaign. Lines are lowess smooths with a span of .75. 
 
 
Starting halfway through 2010, the NDP had 
been steadily increasing its support in 
Ontario, coinciding with two major 
developments. First, on July 1 of that year 
the Ontario government implemented the 
Harmonized Sales Tax (HST), which the 
NDP strongly opposed, making an 
exemption for home heating fuel from the 
HST a key element of its criticisms of the 
government and, later, its platform for the 
2011 campaign. Second, the federal election 
in May 2011 saw a dramatic increase in 
support for the federal NDP in both Quebec 
and Ontario, contributing to an increase in 
support for the provincial party. Despite the 
NDP’s growing support, the net effect of 
these developments was to entrench the 
Progressive Conservatives in first place for 
more than a year prior to the election 
campaign.
4
 
 
 
Policy Positioning 
 
 The voters’ issue agenda was 
reasonably clear in the two years prior to the 
2011 election campaign: health care was 
consistently selected as the most important 
issue, according to Nanos Research (see 
Figure 2). All three parties addressed this, 
placing health care commitments at the 
centre of the policy platforms that they 
issued. However, there were other 
controversies and issues that dominated 
media and political discussion over the life 
of the previous legislature, in particular, 
taxes and the economy. In fact, these two 
increased in salience as the election neared. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 126-140 
 
 
131 
 
Figure 2: The most important provincial issues, as reported by Nanos Research, prior to 
the election campaign. 
 
Regarding taxes, this issue was really about 
the McGuinty government’s introduction of 
the HST. Both the NDP and the Progressive 
Conservatives tried to capitalize on 
opposition to the tax, not by promising to 
get rid of it, but by promising various ways 
of limiting its impact. Although the 
McGuinty government introduced the HST 
much more adroitly than did the Campbell 
government in British Columbia, the 
Liberals were not immune to public 
opposition. Concerns expressed about the 
economy and jobs were not about such 
specific policies, but were a reflection of the 
profound difficulties facing the 
manufacturing sector in Ontario in the wake 
of the 2008 economic crisis. 
 Campaigning against an unpopular 
incumbent government, the PCs adopted 
some of the rhetoric that accompanied 
Barack Obama into the White House in 
2008, namely, “change.” They labeled their 
policy platform the Changebook and every 
section of the document was titled with the 
word “Change.” As for the specific policies 
the party emphasized, the party eliminated 
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political space between themselves and the 
Liberals on some issues (e.g., they adopted 
the same conservative targets for reducing 
corporate taxes and eliminating the deficits 
as well as the commitment to close coal-
fired power plants) and adopted a series of 
fairly banal, business-friendly policy 
initiatives meant to appeal to the business 
community, such as a reduction in 
regulations governing business activity and 
a small-business Bill of Rights. However, 
the PCs also adopted several high-profile 
policies that can only be described as wedge 
issues. 
First, they added several measures 
hostile to trade unions such as requiring 
secret ballot votes to certify all applications 
for representation (currently, the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board may certify unions 
as a bargaining agent without a vote if 55 
per cent of the employees join a union), 
requiring public sector unions to bid on 
public service contracts to deliver work they 
currently do and, lastly, placing more 
restrictions on union expenditures, political 
expenditures in particular. Second, they 
called for changes to corrections policies, 
requiring prisoners to perform community 
service, such as cleaning parks or removing 
graffiti, for free (Ontario Progressive 
Conservative Party 2011). In general, this 
policy positioning suggests a very different 
approach from the one the party took in 
2007 where John Tory tried to present a 
more inclusive platform of extending public 
financing to non-Catholic religious schools. 
The Progressive Conservatives under Tim 
Hudak adopted a much harsher, ideological 
stance. 
Where the PCs ventured into harsher 
ideological territory to define themselves in 
contrast to the Liberals, the governing party 
developed a platform with few specific 
commitments. Most of the Liberal’s policy 
platform is not prospective, but a 
recapitulation of past policies, providing an 
emphasis on their successes and using these 
to justify re-election. The party emphasized 
its previous record on secondary and post-
secondary education as having prepared 
Ontario’s workforce for post-industrial 
demands. In the same vein, the Liberals took 
great pains to emphasize its record in 
attracting investment in the field of green 
technologies. There were two prominent 
exceptions to this platform of justifying past 
accomplishments. Namely, the party 
promised to cover up to 30 percent of the 
tuition costs of undergraduate education, and 
it promised to introduce a tax credit for 
small businesses that hire skilled Canadian 
newcomers (Ontario Liberal Party 2011). 
On the economy, the Liberals 
essentially adopted the frame “stability in 
difficult times,” not dissimilar to rhetoric 
used by the federal Conservative Party in 
2008 and 2011. The front page of their 
campaign platform quoted Premier 
McGuinty as saying: “These are uncertain 
times for the global economy. These are 
challenging times for our families. This is 
our plan to help. This is our way forward, 
together.” This is followed on page 4 by a 
full-page colour photo from a stock market 
exchange showing only negative numbers 
followed by a page of text that places 
Ontario in a global context, featuring several 
newspaper headlines emphasizing the 
economic troubles that have plagued the 
industrialized world since 2008. 
The NDP’s platform also 
emphasized the theme of “change,” but 
emphasized that its “change” is aimed to 
make things easier and more affordable for 
“people like you.” For example, the party 
proposed a cap on weekly increases on gas 
prices. Moreover, it proposed to finance a 
reduction in electricity costs by reorganizing 
the electricity network into one public entity 
and by capping CEO salaries.  The party 
proposed a similar cap on CEO salaries 
within the health care sector (Ontario New 
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Democratic Party 2011).  
While some of these resemble knee-
jerk populist policies, one of the major 
elements of the NDP platform – the 
exemption from the HST for gas, electricity 
and home heating – was very carefully 
thought out. The shift from the previous 
regime of a provincial sales tax and the GST 
also meant a shift in philosophy to a value 
added tax which can provide some benefits 
to any businesses that add value to products 
(i.e., manufacturers). However, it also meant 
that the HST was to be paid on some 
products and services which previously had 
been exempt from the provincial sales tax. 
The NDP was thus caught in something of a 
dilemma. Some groups within the party’s 
universe, such as the Canadian Auto 
Workers and the Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, were cautiously supportive of 
the initiative, particularly because the 
Liberal government had implemented the 
HST in conjunction with new tax credits for 
low- and middle-income taxpayers 
(Lightman and Mitchell 2009). At the same 
time, the public’s overwhelming opposition 
to the tax created a powerful electoral and 
populist temptation to oppose the policy. 
The party’s policy on eliminating the HST 
on home heating fuel, electricity and gas 
was the resulting compromise.  
While the NDP started and finished 
the campaign in third place, again placing 
the party in that awkward space on the 
ideological, electoral and media landscape, 
the party did offer something new. This was 
the first campaign led by Andrea Horwath, 
not the first woman to lead an Ontario 
political party,
5
 but arguably the one with 
the highest profile. Moreover, beyond her 
gender, Horwath represented a different kind 
of break, being the leader who had no link to 
the five controversial years the party spent 
in government from 1990 to 1995. Horwath 
only entered politics as a Hamilton city 
councillor in 1997, was elected to Queen’s 
Park in a 2004 by-election, and won the 
party leadership in 2009. It is perhaps a 
combination of her minimal affiliation with 
the Bob Rae government and her personal 
working-class background that has led to a 
clearly populist approach to politics in 
Ontario. To her credit, this has contributed 
to an increase in popularity and the party 
was able to expand its reach into new 
ridings, winning in Bramalea-Gore-Malton, 
Essex, and Toronto-Davenport. But this has 
also caused her some trouble. For example, 
the party’s demand for exemptions to the 
HST and Horwath’s tentative embraces of 
wind power opponents in rural Ontario have 
caused significant concern among 
environmentalists for their anti-
conservationist consequences. 
  One final comment is worth making 
regarding the NDP’s platform. This platform 
strongly reinforces the trend to move the 
party further away from its historic role as 
an ideological party. Aside from its rather 
vague commitment to reorganize the 
electricity network into one public entity and 
to roll back corporate tax cuts, much of its 
economic platform involves shifting around 
tax credits to co-ordinate particular types of 
economic activity. For example, it pushed 
for a tax credit to subsidize investment in 
machinery and equipment in Ontario and a 
tax credit to subsidize full-time, permanent 
employment.  
 
Campaign Dynamics, Media 
Coverage & Public Opinion 
 
Despite the McGuinty government’s 
unpopularity and the subsequent competitive 
election, the 2011 Ontario election failed to 
generate a great deal of popular excitement. 
Indeed, turnout in the provincial election 
was 49 percent, continuing a twenty-year 
trend of declining turnout (see Table 3).  
Despite this, some issues were 
clearly more important than others in the 
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party’s mind. One thing to assess is what the 
election campaign was, in fact, about. 
Parties go to great lengths to make election 
campaigns “about” issues where voters hold 
positive impressions about them and 
minimize the attention paid to issues where 
voters hold negative impressions (Clarke et 
al., 68-86, 1990; Belanger and Meguid, 
2008; Petrocik 1996). Of course, each 
political party evokes different responses on 
different issues in voters’ minds and so there 
is a conflict within a campaign to set the 
tone. Watching, reporting and shaping these 
conflicts is the press, which sometimes have 
different conceptions of what the election is, 
in fact, “about” (Soroka 2002).  
 
 
Table 3: Turnout in Ontario elections, 1990-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is some evidence to suggest 
that the issues that dominated the 2011 
Ontario campaign differed in ranking to the 
issues voters expressed in the Nanos public 
opinion surveys in Figure 2. We examined 
the issues covered by Ontario newspapers by 
gathering news stories from seven daily 
newspapers
6
 using a search string to capture 
election-related stories (see appendix for all 
details). Then, we constructed short 
dictionaries of terms that corresponded to 
each issue.  
 The left-hand panel in Figure 3 
shows the number of news stories per day – 
divided by the number of terms in each 
dictionary – that contained terms from that 
dictionary. The panel on the right shows the 
average daily frequency of each dictionary’s 
terms, again, divided by the number of terms 
in each dictionary. Unemployment and taxes 
were discussed more frequently than health 
care. The “economy” was discussed 
somewhat more frequently than health care. 
Other issues came far behind. Whether this 
was an example of the media’s independent 
agenda-setting function or a response to 
decisions made by the political parties 
requires a fine-grained analysis that is 
beyond our current scope. Whatever the 
source of this type of media coverage, there 
is evidence to suggest that this development 
was not without consequence. Figure 4 
shows the issues identified as the most 
important issue that determined the votes for 
respondents to Ipsos-Reid’s internet panel 
survey for the Ontario provincial election.
7
 
These results are clearly different from those 
identified by Nanos’ telephone survey by 
random-digit dialing, but they mirror 
findings by Stephenson (2011), also drawn 
from a separate, internet panel survey. Her 
results showed that voters selected the 
economy to be the biggest issue (30 percent) 
followed by taxes and health care (21 
Year Turnout 
1990     64.4 
1995     62.9 
1999     58.3 
2003     56.8 
2007     52.1 
2011     49.2 
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Figure 3: Media agendas over the course of the campaign. 
 
Note: The left panel graphs the number of news stories that contain terms in each dictionary. The graph on the right 
shows the average daily frequency of each dictionary’s terms. Lines are lowess smooths through data points with a 
span of .75.
 
 
Figure 4: Most Important Issue in 2011 Ontario Election 
 
 
 
Note: This graph the distribution of issues respondents selected as the most important issue in determining their vote 
from Ipsos-Reid’s Ontario 2011 panel survey.
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Table 4: Most important issue by 2011 party support (cell entries are percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
percent). Perhaps voter priorities followed 
media coverage. While it is possible that the 
different survey modes (telephone, 
probability sample versus internet, panel 
survey) are responsible for the different 
results, the fact that Nanos reported an 
increasing concern with economic issues 
and the high levels of news coverage 
dedicated to taxes and economic issues, it is 
more likely that voters’ issue priorities 
followed the media and political agendas, 
rather than the other way around.  
The salience of the tax issue, 
particularly the HST, seems to have helped 
both the NDP and the Progressive 
Conservatives gain votes from 2007 to 2011 
(see Table 4). One interesting cell entry is 
the 56 percent of people who moved to the 
PCs from the Liberals, citing taxes as the 
most important issue; 38 percent of Liberal-
to-NDP switchers and only seven percent of 
Liberal “core” supporters did the same. 
Among those who voted for the Liberal 
party in both elections, 64 percent cited 
health care as the most important issue. But 
this single issue was also cited by a 
substantial number of Liberal defectors. 
Why, then, were the Progressive 
Conservatives and Tim Hudak unable to 
capitalize on their substantial pre-election 
lead and win a majority? It is worth pointing 
out that, in addition to shifts in voter 
priorities, the 2011 election campaign was 
marked by substantial shifts in vote intention 
(see Figure 1, right panel). These two shifts 
coincided with three important events. First, 
Hudak – perhaps emboldened by his lead 
and building on the strategy of including 
hot-button wedge issues in his platform – 
attacked a Liberal policy proposal to provide 
employers with a tax credit if they hired new 
Canadians. Hudak and the PC party attacked 
the measure over several days as favouring 
“foreign workers.” Second, on September 
25, just prior to the leaders’ debate, the 
Liberals announced the cancellation of a 
contentious natural gas-fired power plant in 
Mississauga. Hudak’s strategy of stoking 
xenophobic sentiment was widely criticized 
and it gained far greater attention 
(overwhelmingly negative) than did the 
Liberal proposal to cancel the power plants 
(see Figure 5). Third, and lastly, the major 
shift occurred just after the leader’s debate, 
as shown in the right pane of Figure 1.  
We can provide some circumstantial 
evidence to support the impact of each of 
these events. First, in terms of Hudak’s 
comments about “foreign workers,” Figure 5 
shows that the media seized on that issue to 
a much greater degree than it did to 
McGuinty’s decision to cancel the 
Mississauga power plant. Tellingly, 
coverage of the issue died as soon as the 
PCs dropped the term from radio advertising 
on September 12, signaling that they would 
step back from the term. We believe that this 
episode was costly for the PCs in that it 
 Liberal to PC Liberal to Liberal Liberal To NDP 
Taxes  56    7  38 
Health Care  26  64  49 
Debt/deficit  17    9    3 
Education    1  20  10 
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contributed to voters’ distrust of Hudak as 
leader and his party in general. Voters who 
shifted to the PCs in 2011, after having 
supported the Liberals in 2007, did so 
overwhelmingly because of a 
disappointment with the Liberals, rather than 
because of any kind of positive attraction to 
the PC leader or the platform.  
  
 
Figure 5: Relative impact on media coverage of Hudak’s “foreign workers” criticisms and 
the Liberals’ cancellation of the Mississauga power plant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, some admittedly very 
circumstantial evidence that the decision to 
cancel the Mississauga plant and the 
importance of the television debate were 
both highly influential is seen in Table 5, 
which lists Ipsos survey respondents’ timing 
of vote choice. What is notable here is the 
proportion of PC voters who reported 
making up their mind to vote that way 
before the election began, compared to the 
proportion of Liberal and NDP voters who 
reported deciding to support their party after 
the debates. This is consistent with the shift 
in public opinion toward the Liberals in the 
second half of the campaign and consistent 
with the general impression that much of 
Hudak’s support in the campaign came as a 
result of opposition to policies by the 
Liberal government, but that the PCs failed 
to build on this with a hard-edged campaign 
that alienated centrist voters. 
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Table 5: Timing of vote decision by vote, percentage of Ipsos-Reid 2011 Ontario 
Panel Survey respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The May 2011 federal election was not the 
only campaign in that year to show how 
dramatically campaign events can impact 
outcomes. The outcome of Ontario’s general 
election was not easily foreseeable. The 
McGuinty Liberals had been languishing in 
public opinion polls for years and they had 
been in power during a time when the 
province went through a profound economic 
recession. Moreover, the Liberals were also 
faced with a resurgent NDP that heavily 
emphasized populist issues.  
The Ontario 2011 election campaign 
exhibited significant and important 
dynamics that mattered for the outcome. The 
issues that survey respondents selected as 
the most important to their vote differed 
substantially from issues that citizens 
reported as being the most important in the 
two years prior to the election. Whether this 
is evidence of media agenda-setting or 
political agenda-setting is not clear, but what 
is clear is that the political discussion shifted 
from health care to taxes and the economy 
as soon as the election began. This hurt the 
Liberals substantially. However, despite Tim 
Hudak’s lead in the polls at the start of the 
campaign, events shifted public opinion. His 
attack on foreign workers attracted 
substantial negative media coverage – and it 
reinforced voter hesitations about him and 
his party. Towards the latter part of the 
campaign, Liberal fortunes recovered, 
paving the way leading to their re-election, 
albeit with a much reduced parliamentary 
presence. While it may be too much to say 
that the Liberals won the election campaign, 
it does seem that the Progressive 
Conservatives lost it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Liberal NDP PC 
Before the campaign 
started 
39 37 55 
Before the debates 20 17 17 
Shortly after the 
debates 
17 20 13 
In the last week of 
the campaign 
16 17 10 
In the voting booth 
today 
8 9 5 
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Appendix 
 
We used the tm package available for the 
open source statistical software package R to 
conduct basic content analysis. Doing so 
required the construction of a function to 
read in news stories in the particular format 
delivered by ProQuest’s Canadian 
Newsstand database. These functions are 
available for download from Kiss’ faculty 
webpage at Wilfrid Laurier University 
(Google search: wlu.ca Simon Kiss). Then 
we pre-processed these texts by stripping out 
whitespace, punctuation, combined some 
two-word phrases into one words (i.e. 
climate change became climate change), 
converted all words to lower-case letters and 
stemmed the articles using R’s 
implementation of the Porter Stemmer. Then 
we constructed seven issue dictionaries to 
measure salience of various political issues 
and applied the Porter Stemmer to them. 
These are in the second column of Table 6. 
We tabulated the frequency of each term in 
each of the term dictionaries. Some terms 
appeared very rarely and these were 
eliminated arbitrarily. The final, stemmed 
dictionary terms are in the third column. 
Then, for each dictionary, the number of 
news stories that contained at least one of 
the words was tabulated for each day and 
divided by the number of terms in the 
dictionary to account for the fact that some 
dictionaries have three, while others only 
two or one terms in them. The second 
measure of the media agenda was calculated 
by calculated the average frequency of all 
the dictionary terms for each day, again for 
each dictionary, and divided by the number 
of terms in each dictionary.  
 
  
Table 6: Issue dictionaries 
 
Issue  Stemmed First Dictionary Stemmed Second dictionary 
Health care Hospit, healthcar, doctor, 
physician, nurs 
Hospit, healthcar 
Taxes Hst, tax  Hst tax 
Jobs / 
Unemployment 
Job, unemploy, 
apprenticeship, apprentice 
Job 
Environmental 
issues 
Climatechang, solar, wind, 
renew, greenenergi, pollut 
Solar, wind, greenergi 
Education teacher, educat, student, 
school 
Educ, student, school 
Debt/ Deficit Debt, deficit Debt, deficit 
The Economy Economy, economi Econom, economi 
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Endnotes: 
 
1
 Elizabeth Witmer was originally elected in 1990 as 
a PC member to the riding of Waterloo North. The 
constituency changed to Kitchener-Waterloo in 
1999. 
2
 For an analysis of the 2007 Ontario election, see 
Perrella et al. (2008). 
3
 It might be noted that the Green Party also contested 
seats throughout the province, but saw its vote fade 
from eight to 2.9 percent, their approximate level in 
2003, and exceed 10 percent of the vote in only one 
constituency, Dufferin-Caledon, where the Green 
Party candidate, Rob Strang, received 14.6 percent 
of the vote. 
4
 The instability of the present situation is reflected in 
the fact that while the Conservatives returned to 
this position almost immediately after the election, 
the Liberals regained first place after Kathleen 
Wynne was sworn in as premier. See, for instance, 
Ontario seat projections based on aggregated polls: 
http://www.lispop.ca/Ontarioseatprojection.html. 
5
 The Ontario Liberals elected in 1992 Lyn McLeod, 
the province’s first female leader of a major 
political party. 
6
 The newspapers examined are: Globe & Mail, 
National Post, Waterloo Region Record, Hamilton 
Spectator, Toronto Star, Windsor Star and Ottawa 
Citizen. 
7
 Ipsos Reid conducted a survey of a randomly 
selected sample of its internet panelists the day of 
the Ontario election. As a result, the demographics 
of the survey participants differ markedly from the 
Ontario population. For example, the sample was 
heavily skewed to older, female Ontarians, away 
from younger, male Ontarians. To account for this, 
we weighted the sample for age and gender 
according to the 2011 census statistics for Ontario. 
All statistics reported here are weighted. On the 
comparable merits of internet panel surveys 
compared to probability samples from telephone 
surveys, see Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2011). 
